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Abstract 
As forecasted by the Japanese government, the country’s economy will 
grow, although slowly. This expectation is determined by the risk that the labour 
market situation and the worldwide business cycle will keep deteriorating. It is 
believed that the economy will not be spurred by exports growing as a result of 
worldwide recovery, but rather by a series of stabilization packages and 
gradually expanding domestic demand61. The expectations should be treated 
with a great deal of cautiousness, because of the highly unpredictable rate of 
unemployment, the concerns about deflation and the probability of the global 
recession turning out more serious than expected. 
According to the AFP (Gazeta Wyborcza of 08 Dec. 2009), in the third 
quarter of 2009 the Japanese economy finally showed some signs of recovery 
and reached positive values; unemployment also dropped from 5.3% to 5.1% 
between September and October. The widespread opinion is that the recovery is 
very fragile, as proved by the steadily falling prices, deflation, and the rising yen 
exchange rate (the highest in the last 14 years – 84 yen to 1 US dollar), 
threatening the Japanese exports. 
                                                 
∗
 Ph. D., Professor at the University of Łódź 
61
 Based on the Key Points of the Japanese Economy, internal documents of the Economic 
Section of Japan Embassy in Poland, 15 July, 2009. 
112                                                        Jolanta Młodawska 
1. Introduction 
The present recession in Japan, induced by the global crisis, is the most 
serious of all recessions noted in the years of post-war development. The falling 
foreign trade turnover rapidly reduced exports and private investments, while 
growing unemployment and falling wages negatively affected the level of 
consumption. Even though it is believed that an expansive fiscal policy may 
have a positive, although limited, effect on economic growth, its rate will be 
below 1% throughout the year 2010 (see table 1). 
The Bank of Japan is determined to counteract inflation by „injecting” 
additional funds into the economy, until a stable upward trend appears. 
However, once the economy is back on the growth trajectory, the primary goal 
will become the consolidation of government’s revenues, considering the large 
budget deficit and the huge public debt (around 140% of GDP). Some of the 
paramount strategic goals include the tax system and social security system 
reforms as well as a necessary structural reform addressing mainly the service 
sector, because of the aging of Japanese society. 
Table. 1 Japan’s real GDP as estimated by various institutions (%) 
Calendar year 2008 2009 2010 
IMF „World Economic Outlook” (July) 
- 0.7 
- 6.0 1.7 
OECD „Economic Outlook 85” (June) - 6.8 0.7 
Fiscal year 2008 2009 2010 
Government (January) 
-3.3 
0.0 - 
Prime Minister’s Office (July) - 3.3 - 
Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy 
(July) - 0.6 
1
 
Bank of Japan (July) - 3.4 2 1.0 2 
1
 data presented only for the 2010 budget discussion  
2
 a median derived from the projections of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy 
Source: Internal documents of the Economic Section, Japan Embassy in Poland, 15 June 2009. 
                                                Japan’s new competitive advantage…                                           113 
The short-term goals of the Japanese economic policy were laid out in the 
„Anti-crisis Package” of 10 April 2009. The package is valued at ¥ 15.4 trillion 
(the national budget) and ¥ 56. 8 trillion (local budgets)62, equivalent to US$ 81 
bn, to be spent in a twelve month period. The impact of this huge money supply 
is estimated at additional 1.9% of real GDP. The target amount in a long-term 
perspective is at least US$ 274 billion. However, the Stimulation Package does 
not address the essential problems, such as the weakness of the global economy 
and deflation. 
The main measures included in the Package are public works undertaken 
on an unprecedented scale, employment-supporting projects (re-employment and 
retraining assistance, creation of new jobs, unemployment benefits, social 
security benefits), as well as financial support for the qualifying entities and 
lines of economic development (SMEs, the stock exchange, residential building 
and transactions involving land). „Investments in future” are proposed, such as 
the development of alternative energy source (e.g. solar energy), the 
construction of low fuel consumption vehicles and new methods for storing and 
transporting energy. There are plans to support financially healthcare, the 
longevity of the nation and measures improving the rate of natural increase. An 
important goal is exploitation of reserves based on the development of the 
backward segments of Japan’s economy, such as agriculture, forestry, fishery, 
and on the creation of new technologies. 
From the wide range of the long-term problems, the article (Parts I and II) 
will discuss: 
1. the „aging” of Japanese society, 
2. the redefinition of economy’s competitiveness, 
3. capital flows – foreign direct investments (FDI), 
4. the „dual” character of the Japanese economy, 
5. the necessary structural reform and privatisation, 
6. the concept of new industries. 
The above subject will be discussed in relation to the traditional Japanese-
continental (Rhine) model of corporate governance functioning in Japan in 
contrast to the Anglo-American model. 
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2. The Japanese corporate governance model 
H. Funabashi63 indicated eight principles underpinning a traditional Japanese 
firm: 
• clear, well-defined values, vision of operation and mission, 
• long-term planning, 
• accentuating the human factor in an enterprise, 
• focus on customers, 
• social functions of an enterprise, 
• continuous innovation and improvement, 
• frugality and effective use of resources, 
• special organizational culture, tradition. 
The above list well corresponds to the known characteristics of the Rhine 
corporate governance model64: 
• workforce plays a vital role in an enterprise, 
• pay inequalities are insignificant (i.e. the income differences between the 
managers and the workforce), 
• dismissals are occasional, 
• the major source of investment funds is bank debt, 
• the in-house managers are promoted. 
The above structure contrasts with the Anglo-American model where: 
• the shareholders’ rights prevail over the employees’ rights, 
• information on a firm is readily available and accessible, 
• the short-term results are prioritized, which leads to employee dismissals in 
the downturn periods, 
• managers’ incomes are closely related to performance, 
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• the investment funds are mainly raised on the stock exchange, 
• the directors are recruited in the market, 
• mergers and acquisitions are deemed a guarantee of good economic results. 
3. The demographic situation and the necessary reform of the pensions and 
social security system in Japan 
Why is the aging of the Japanese society and the declining natural 
increase such an important problem at the present stage of development? In the 
1990s, soon after the speculative bubble burst, the Japanese economy plunged 
into recession that continued for more than a decade, relieved by short spells of 
recovery that mainly resulted from the large-scale public works, tax cuts and 
other measures „feeding money” into the economy. Their influence radically 
diminished when the government reduced its expenditures. The stimulating 
package of 2006 was estimated at a still large amount of ¥ 15.4 trillion, though. 
The business cycle improved in 2002 as a result of other developments, 
mainly the energetic activity of the private sector with the weakening fiscal 
impulse. In the next four years, Japanese businesses almost completely dealt 
with three excesses: surplus employment, production capacities inflated in the 
period of prosperity and bad debts. However, a continued growth calls for 
measures other than the extensive ones. The macro economic policy (fiscal and 
monetary) fell short of energizing the economy. The recession that followed the 
„bubble-driven growth period” had two special characteristics. Firstly, the 
annual rate of growth was ca 1%, i.e. much below its values in the other post-
war decades, and the period of still noticeable decline is much longer. Secondly, 
deflation appeared (the GDP deflator was negative starting with the third quarter 
of 1994, excluding the fiscal year 1997, when the VAT rate was raised). After 
2006, Japan’s economic situation deteriorated again. 
Deflation stayed at a moderate level of around 0.5% a year for a long 
time. In 1991, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) started following a zero interest rate 
policy, a solution without precedent in the world. Before the policy was 
abandoned in 2006, the BOJ had reduced interest rates as many as twelve times. 
The base interest rates stood at 0.1% from the year 1999. As they could not be 
reduced still lower, they lost their stimulating influence on the economy. At the 
same time, the “cheap money” policy pursued from 2001 completely lost its 
announcement effect, i.e. the ability of informing the public about the planned 
changes in the government policy. Although the negative growth trend in Japan 
has been slowly receding for seven years now, a structural reform seems to be 
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more and more desirable. The Japanese economy has today the highest unit 
labour cost in the world65 and in 2005 the number of the Japanese population 
started to decrease for the first time. This is the main problem of the country 
where population aging is faster than elsewhere and where the rate of natural 
increase is also falling the fastest. 
The present Nippon’s population of 128 million is likely to fall to 118 
million by the year 2030 and the percentage of seniors (aged 65+) is predicted to 
grow from 19.9 to 29.6%. This course of events will reduce the amount of 
savings that have been the major source of investment funds so far. In 1991, 
savings still increased at 15% a year, but in 2003 the rate was 7.3%. As 
projected, households’ savings will reach negative values by 2030. The 
aforementioned necessity of launching structural reforms means therefore that 
the way of increasing capital gains should be FDI intensification as well as 
improved allocation of resources: seeking new high-tech branches and 
restructuring the ineffective parts of the economy. 
Within the Japanese pension system, a range of problems and 
inconsistencies can be spotted. There are at least four issues that are worth 
raising. Firstly, although the average life expectancy of the Japanese population 
is the longest in the world, many firms still stick to the statutory retirement age 
of 60 years. The regulations introduced in 2006 obligated the employers to keep 
their workforce until 63 years of age, with the law becoming effective as of 
April 2007, when a large number of baby boomers were to turn 60 years old. 
This solution was a provisional remedial measure and most firms kept the age 
limit of 60 years, allowing only the interested persons to extend their 
employment contracts every year. 
Secondly, the young Japanese are losing their trust in the public social 
security system. Almost half of persons older than 29 years usually build their 
retirement plans on personal savings and not on public mechanisms. Around 36 
% of the citizens running their own firms and students aged 20+ do not 
contribute to the pension system at all66.  
With the longest life expectancy among the developed countries of the 
world, the Japanese also have the lowest old-age pensions. Besides, most 
citizens still want to work in their middle adulthood – 70% of males aged 60-65 
years are economically active or seek employment. In the USA the rate is below 
60% and for Germany it is only 30%. Thirdly, measures aimed at reducing youth 
unemployment are still relatively rare, because many enterprises have kept the 
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lifetime employment approach despite the amended laws, and the financial crisis 
of 1997 limited the recruitment of graduates. Fourthly, the Japanese corporations 
have substantially extended their use of temporary workforce at the expense of 
workers with employment contracts, thus deteriorating the situation of young 
persons again. 
Natural increase is still another problem – the 2005 fertility rate in Japan 
was only 1.25. To maintain the present size of population at least, the rate should 
be 2.07. The following measures are therefore necessary to induce the required 
change: 
1. friendly economic and social solutions addressed to the fertile-age 
population, 
2. a reform of the pension and social security system, allowing older persons to 
work longer and thus reducing the burden carried by the younger generation, 
3. better conditions for mothers raising children. 
The detailed solutions in the state pension system decide about the 
credibility of the whole decision-making mechanism and about its daily 
management. Regarding the latter aspect, the large number of deficiencies, or 
even scandals, that were discovered recently in SIA functioning (Social 
Insurance Agency) made the public distrustful in the actions devised by the 
officials. The situation is aggravated by a much more serious issue – the possible 
inefficiency of the whole system resulting directly from the rapid aging of the 
Japanese population and indirectly from the fact that Japanese pensions are paid 
out “on a current basis”, which means that their source is contributions 
submitted by the economically active population. Another important factor is 
that many firms still exercise the retirement age limit of 60 years. 
The authorities have launched many measures to alleviate the present 
situation; for instance, higher contributions and lower old-age pensions were 
enacted, and the employers are encouraged to raise the retirement age 
significantly, or to conclude three years’ contracts with older workers. 
Notwithstanding, as mentioned, the number of persons, especially the young 
ones, who completely withdraw from the government system has been growing, 
Unlike the older generation that will recover the amounts it has paid to the 
system during the entire period of economic activity, the younger people cannot 
be sure of that. This situation has given rise to the problem of social injustice 
embedded in the intergenerational context. So it cannot be surprising that 
although all Japanese turning 21 years are expected to contribute to the pension 
fund, a growing percentage of such persons refuse to do so. 
Each time the demographic projections overshoot the actual rate of natural 
increase, the government tries to fix the situation by increasing the level of 
118                                                        Jolanta Młodawska 
insurance contributions and reducing the amounts of the benefits. It is being 
proposed now that the entire amount of an old-age pension (a so-called base 
pension) be funded from taxes, instead of the present solution where two thirds 
of the pension comes from the obligatory contributions and one third from 
taxes67. If this variant were to be implemented, then the present VAT rate of 5% 
would have to be increased by as many as five percentage points. A monthly 
pension would remain at the level of ¥ 66,000 (ca US$ 600), but only in the case 
of those retirees who have contributed to the system for 40 years. Contributions 
paid regularly for the whole period of 25 years would entitle to a reduced old-
age pension and any negligence (e.g. a month contribution missing) would 
deprive the potential beneficiary of any equivalent! 
The government pension is now granted to persons reaching the age of 65 
years, but raising the limit to 67 years is proposed, so that considerable VAT 
increases can be avoided. Consequently, private entrepreneurs are also expected 
raise the retirement age. In the transition period, the beneficiaries covered by the 
old system would draw their old age pensions in proportion to the number of 
pensionable years. Such persons would be included in both the new and the 
existing system. There are also plans to limit the income tax exemptions in the 
case of persons drawing old age pensions so as to decrease government’s net 
subsidies to the well-off seniors. Today, employers are obligated to finance half 
of the obligatory workers’ contributions to the base pensions. The proposed 
modification of the system for financing pensions, where tax revenues replace 
enterprise resources would considerably reduce employers’ liabilities. The 
Nikkei Inc. Panel suggests that some of the savings thus obtained could be used 
to extend the pension system over the temporary and seasonal workers. The 
Panel’s report also proposes to replace the term „a base pension” with  
„a universal pension” to accentuate the direction of the changes. 
4. The competitiveness of the Japanese economy – a definitional change. 
The Japanese FDI as illustrated by the case of Poland 
Globalization preferences successively reshape the character of  
a competitive advantage. Competitiveness depends today on having  
a knowledge-based economy with flexible modes of operation and structures. In 
the past, Japan paid special attention to the cultural factors and the role played 
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by institutions. Why has Japan lost so much of its competitiveness in the last two 
decades? 
Competitiveness seems to have much deeper roots than culture and 
tradition alone, and the export of capital services and technologies outweighs 
low manufacturing costs. Notwithstanding, contemporary Japan concentrates 
on routine operations, unlike the other developed economies that build strategies 
and oversee institutional changes. The real challenge is investment-driven 
development, but in Japan the number of investments has been falling alongside 
the declining rate of savings. 
„The World Competitiveness Yearbook” of 2002 recognized the USA as 
the most competitive economy in the world and Finland was ranked second68. 
Japan, ranked 26th in 2002, slid into the 30th position a year later (Poland 
oscillates around the 45th position). It is worth mentioning that in 1991 Japan 
was the leader in the same ranking, with the USA and Germany being second 
and third, respectively. The year 1991 marked a watershed in the speculative 
growth of the Japanese economy, opening at the same time the longest period of 
US expansion after World War II. 
Dynamically growing FDI is believed to have a strong, spurring effect on 
country’s competitive advantage. The incoming and outgoing investments in 
Japan are imbalanced, as the outgoing FDI largely exceeds its inflow69. In 1996, 
the incoming and outgoing flows of investments accounted for US$ 23.4 bn and 
only US$ 200 million, respectively, growing in 2000 to US$ 31.5 bn and US$ 
8.2 bn. The White Paper on International Trade of 200170 presents “shocking” 
comparative data. In 1998, the received FDI’s share in gross capital assets 
averaged 11.1% in the world, 10.9% in the developed countries and 15.3% in the 
EU (see table 2). Regarding the particular countries, the rate was 12.8% in the 
USA, 12.9% in China and 5.5% in Korea. Among the European countries, 
Sweden had the rate at the level of 59.8%, in the Netherlands it was 55.2%, 
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51.3% in Finland, and 25.7% in the UK. In Japan the rate was extremely low – 
0.3%! 
Japan’s focus on boosting the outbound FDI and her underestimation of 
the inbound FDI separate the country from the world trends and make it less 
appealing to foreign firms. Perhaps this situation should entail an adjustment of 
the country’s broadly understood investment environment and infrastructure? 
However, this course of action is inseparable from launching a fully fledged 
structural reform. 
Table 2. The incoming FDI values (in US$ billions) 
Ranked 
(1999) Country 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1 USA 479 675 770 1060 1863 2755 
2 UK 324 225 324 370 637 848 
3 Sweden 20 149 55 103 194 594 
4 Germany  120 32 117 201 522 
5 France 132 237 220 231 295 388 
6 China 35 359 402 442 438 388 
7 Belgium/Luxembourg 81 105 147 120 227 384 
8 Netherlands 123 115 78 118 372 342 
9 Brazil 10 49 99 197 319 327 
10 Canada 76 108 64 118 217 251 
11 Argentina 18 42 43 88 67 236 
12 Hong Kong     148 231 
13 Ireland 6 15 25 27 110 191 
14 Japan 18 0 2 32 33 123 
Source: IMF data, International Financial Statistics. 
Japan’s current account balance still shows the largest surplus in the world 
that reached ¥ 18 trillion (around US$ 150 bn) in 2005. However, its structure 
has been changing in time. The capital incomes, i.e. capital gains and dividends, 
exceeded the incomes derived from foreign trade for the first time in 2005  
                                                Japan’s new competitive advantage…                                           121 
(¥ 11.4 trillion and ¥ 10.4 trillion, respectively). The current account surplus 
represented around 4% of the Japanese GDP. However, the growing investment 
incomes were still accompanied by small amounts of the incoming FDI. The 
amounts of the received FDI are very important for Japan’s further economic 
growth, considering that its population is aging and the natural increase is 
falling. 
Japan’s weak interest in the outgoing FDI can be illustrated with the 
magnitudes and structure of the Japanese FDI in Central and Eastern Europe, 
particularly in Poland. The national characteristics of the Japanese and their 
patterns of behaviour largely determine their business attitudes: they tend to take 
group actions, revealing a sort of a „herd instinct”. They have difficulty 
launching overseas projects on their own account but willingly join other 
initiatives, such direct investments, portfolio investments or strategic alliances. 
Some of the reasons encouraging Japanese businesses to invest in the CEE 
countries are the following71: 1) attractive markets; 2) lower labour costs 
compared with Western Europe – although Poland cannot compete against 
China or the former USSR countries as far as the low-skilled labour costs are 
concerned, the professional bearing and the language skills of the Polish „white 
collars” are ranked high among other nationalities; 3) the possibility of acquiring 
production facilities that allow the Japanese firms to make and sale their 
products (e.g. Magyar Suzuki in Hungary and NSK, the producer of ball 
bearings and spark plugs, in Poland). 
The incoming investments substantially increased across Central Europe 
following the admission of the regional states to the European Union. The 
investments almost doubled in 2004 compared with the previous year, reaching 
the level of US$ 16.3 bn. A year later, their maximal value went up to US$ 28 
bn72. Although the absolute numbers may show Poland as the largest beneficiary 
among the CEE countries, her relatively large population makes the Polish FDI 
per capita vary from one third to one fourth of its value in Hungary, the Czech 
Republic or Estonia. The inflow of investments in relation to Polish GDP is 
around 25% and it does not compare, for instance, with the Estonian 78.6%73. 
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At the end of 2004, the Polish investments of 15 foreign firms were 
estimated to exceed US$ 1 bn, the largest investors being, by their size, France 
Telecom, EBRD and Fiat. The main type of business in the group was financial 
intermediation. The Japanese were almost imperceptible in the CEE region, with 
their turnover with the CEE countries estimated at only 0.2% in the early 1990s, 
i.e. 0.4% of the value of the Japanese trade with abroad. In this decade, the 
Japanese FDI (excluding few firms such as Suzuki) were mainly represented by 
the wholesaling and retail business, as well as exports of the Japanese 
manufacturing industry, predominantly the machine-building industry (Japanese 
manufacturers operating through their EU branches). 
In the mid-1990s, the Japanese boosted their investment activity in this 
part of the world, focusing their attention on the manufacturing industry, but 
even then, the Japanese FDI in the CEE region was estimated at only US$ 2.8 bn 
as of the end of 2000. Because of the forthcoming admission of 12 new 
countries to the European Union in 2004, the Japanese raised their CEE 
investments to US$ 24.4 bn in 2002, but this number still accounted for only 
0.5% of their outgoing FDI. Most of the investments were made in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland74. This policy intended to secure the potential 
markets and export opportunities for the mother companies in Japan. The 
Japanese investments in CEE were “narrowly” channelled into two favoured 
branches of industry: automotive and electromechanical engineering, as it was 
expected that the more restrictive environmental laws specific to the European 
Union would boost the demand for new cars in the recently admitted countries 
and that the better-off citizens would choose to have a second car in the family. 
At first, the Polish government promoted capital privatisation with the 
participation of foreign investors (mergers and acquisitions), but with legislation 
amendments in the second half of the 1990s that „warmed up” the investment 
climate in Poland the major types of the incoming FDI changed. 
The relaxation of the tax rules applying to foreign firms and the 
abandonment of regulations limiting the ownership of stocks, the values of new 
issues, or employment, etc., increased the number of investments with foreign-
owned majority stake, mainly of the greenfield projects. At the end of 2006, over 
150 Japanese corporations traded and manufactured in the territory of Poland. 
Between 2000 and 2007, the number of the manufacturing enterprises grew from 
14 to 58. Poland probably ranks fifth as the European recipient of the Japanese 
investments, after the UK, France, Germany and the Czech Republic75. 
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The major Japanese projects in Poland include the Toyota Motor Poland 
plants in Wałbrzych that manufacture gear boxes and low-compression engines 
and the so-called Crystal Park near Toruń where the production of plasma TV 
sets started in 2006; the major player in the Crystal Park is Sharp. Unfortunately, 
the Japanese invariably underline several disadvantages that make our country 
less attractive as a destination for investments: 1) a very low share of R+D 
outlays in GDP (0.58% in 2006) compared with the EU average of 1.9%76; 2) 
some shortage of highly-qualified labour (the middle-level management); 3) the 
slow implementation of investment incentives that are applied in the EU; 4) the 
poor condition of roads. 
5. The microeconomic operational effectiveness versus strategic 
effectiveness 
Japan’s problems with economic growth are due to the errors in 
macroeconomic policy, but primarily to the low microeconomic effectiveness of 
many branches of industry, services and agriculture. This is not to mean that the 
government’s measures aimed at stimulating growth and restoring banking 
sector’s liquidity are unimportant; yet, the macroeconomic policy tools alone 
cannot bring the expected results. The Bank of Japan followed the policy of  
a short-term zero discount rate for a long time; public works, tax cuts, subsidies 
for the „lame” banks, and even food vouchers consumed almost US$ 1.5 bn. All 
the extraordinary measures failed the hopes that were vested in them. 
As regards the operational competitiveness, many Japanese firms still 
adhere to the cost minimization principle while lacking distinct long-term 
strategies. Naturally, there are some positive exceptions in their group, but these 
are not the powerful, well-established corporations, but the relatively new firms 
that started up in the 1980s or 1990s and are “infected” by the traditional model 
of a Japanese enterprise to a rather low degree. Unable to use the resources and 
power arising from the connections with the industrial-financial groups 
„keiretsu”, they had to specialise themselves and fill in the identified production 
niches that were rejected by the dominating investors77. The group of the global 
market leaders comprises today organizations with definite strategies, such as 
Nintendo, Sega and Sony – video games; Toray – carbon fibres, or Juki with its 
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industrial sewing machines. Toray decided to meet the needs of a selected group 
of sports equipment manufacturers, giving up orders from the defence and space 
sectors. Regarding sewing machines, Juki chose the industrial segment, 
abandoning household sewing machines. 
Developing a programme where the products and the buyers are clearly 
differentiated is a necessity today, also for the Japanese giants. For instance, in 
the industry producing fax machines, the leading manufacturers undermined the 
profitability of the business by not selecting the distribution channels and by 
introducing standard products unattached to a specific producer to the market. 
As a result, rather indistinguishable advertising campaigns launched by 
behemoths such as Matsushita, Canon, Toshiba, Ricoh, NEC, Sharp, Mitsubishi, 
Fujitsu, Hitachi, Murata and Minolta did not emphasise specialization and 
diversification. The large corporations usually favoured price competition, 
which reduced the average price of a fax machine in Japan from ¥ 78,717 to  
¥ 42,498 yens between 1992 and 199878. 
Replacing the focus on the present, on the volume of production, with  
a strategic approach emphasising originality and ensuring expected revenues 
involves appropriate readjustment of the corporate governance system, the 
enterprise model and the role of the government79. In Japan, around 60% of the 
large firms’ stocks are held by stable, long term shareholders (banks, insurance 
institutions, and cooperating enterprises). They do not demand particularly high 
returns and resale their holdings quite rarely, tending to treat the assets as  
a secure deposit rather than an investment. The main advantage of the cross-
shareholding system is a stable and expanding network of contacts within the 
capital group. It is not surprising therefore, that with this ownership structure 
firm expansion (sales boosting) and job creation in the cooperating organizations 
motivate the managers more strongly than the short-term profitability. 
Japan certainly needs a new corporate governance model, because its 
economy shall not be able to solve the competitiveness problem without placing 
a stronger emphasis on a more effective use of capital and satisfying profits. 
Increased transparency and openness of the decision-making processes are 
necessary, likewise more independent boards of directors and shareholders with 
a true influence over the companies’ strategies. 
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To build a new model of the Japanese enterprise a different system of 
accountability is needed. In the post-war period, firms were controlled by the 
government ministers and banks. The cross-shareholding mechanism existing 
within the powerful financial-industrial groups promoted friendly terms between 
their participants rather than economic responsibility for the corporation. The 
risk of bankruptcy or hostile takeover actually did not exist and the nature of 
corporate governance frequently encouraged overinvestment, careless approach 
to profitability and never-ending support for the profitless products and 
enterprises running at a loss. However, it has been found recently that the system 
of traditional ties is changing – the numerous scandals and the resistance to the 
proliferation of the laws has eroded the power of bureaucracy and, additionally, 
the commercial banks have lost their substantial power over enterprises that 
radically reduced their debts originating in the „bubble economy” period. 
At the same time, new priorities for the government role have 
appeared, particularly in the field of innovation. The Japanese economic policy 
traditionally favoured large-sized enterprises and powerful keiretsu. As 
mentioned earlier, in the past the Japanese government actively participated in 
identifying modern products and technologies and created the R+D cartels 
responsible for distributing the government funding. At present, the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has shifted its operational focus and 
works on providing conditions conducive to the development of an innovative 
economy, improving the scientific and technical staff’s skills (human resources), 
removing the various barriers impeding economic growth and on withdrawing 
the protection of the unprofitable sectors. 
6. Conclusion 
As indicated in the main theme of the article, to build her new competitive 
advantage and spur growth, Japan will have to harness her potential reserves 
hidden in the components of the socio-economic system by80: 
1. organizing the state universities as the centres where new ideas and new 
products are created (knowledge and basic research), 
2. recognizing that the small and medium-sized enterprises are as important for 
economic progress as the large firms are, 
3. following an innovation strategy based on rivalry rather than cooperation, 
                                                 
80
 See M. Porter, H. Takeuchi, M. Sakakibara, Can Japan Compete?, London 2000. 
126                                                        Jolanta Młodawska 
4. increasing the number of the small-sized enterprises through the 
improvement of their access to the nominal capital in the form of guaranteed 
bank credits, as well as making it easier for them to raise funds on the stock 
exchange, 
5. initiating clusters that stimulate economic growth, containing both the 
cooperating and competing organizations, and abandoning the “large-firm 
obsession”, with the consequent departure from the maximisation of shares 
in the domestic sales towards the participation in the global competition in 
selected products. 
Summing up, in the past the Japanese government performed the 
allocation, control and domestic competition restraining functions, in line with 
the orderly growth theory that promotes equal opportunities for particular 
organizations and branches in the economy. To enterprises and economic 
segments being especially promising exporters the theory of infant industry 
protectionism was applied. The existing economic growth determinants call for 
the radical reworking of the practical goals and their theoretical context. The 
formation of a competitive business environment, stronger competition among 
the micro firms and modern understanding of the term ‘innovation’ turn out to 
be as precious as gold. 
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Streszczenie 
 
NOWA PRZEWAGA KONKURENCYJNA JAPONII: ARGUMENTY  
I PROPOZYCJE NA RZECZ PRZEORIENTOWANIA STRUKTUR  
 
Zgodnie z prognozami rządowymi gospodarka Japonii będzie dźwigać się w górę, 
chociaż w powolnym tempie. Istnieje bowiem niebezpieczeństwo dalszego pogarszania 
się sytuacji w sferze zatrudnienia i koniunktury na rynkach zagranicznych. Panuje 
przekonanie, że nie należy się spodziewać pobudzenia gospodarki wskutek wzrostu 
eksportu, będącego z kolei efektem ożywienia w skali międzynarodowej, a raczej  
w wyniku kolejnych pakietów stabilizacyjnych i stopniowego wzrostu popytu 
wewnętrznego. Te prognozy należy traktować z dużą ostrożnością ze względu na znaczną 
nieprzewidywalność co do wysokości stopy bezrobocia, obawy odnośnie deflacji oraz 
prawdopodobieństwo, że recesja światowa może się okazać głębsza, niż się przypuszcza. 
Jak podaje agencja AFP (Gazeta Wyborcza z 08.12.2009) japońska gospodarka 
wreszcie ożywiła się w trzecim kwartale bieżącego roku, wychodząc na wielkości 
dodatnie, spadło też bezrobocie z 5,3% we wrześniu do 5,1% w październiku. 
Przeważają głosy że ożywienie jest bardzo kruche. Mogą o tym świadczyć wciąż 
spadające ceny, deflacja, a także rosnący kurs jena (najwyższy od 14 lat w stosunku do 
dolara: 84 jeny na 1 dolara), co zagraża japońskiemu eksportowi.  
